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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court violated Mr. Angelos' 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel by 
conducting the sentencing hearing and imposing sentence without 
legal counsel. This issue is reviewable for plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-
09 (Utah 1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Preservation of Issue or Statement of Grounds for Review 
Issues involving plain error and exceptional circumstances 
constitute an exception to the preservation rule and thus may be 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
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2. Whether the district court denied Mr. Angelos of his 
constitutional and statutory rights to due process by failing, 
among other things, to provide him with an evidentiary hearing 
prior to summarily imposing sentence. This issue is reviewable 
for plain error or exceptional circumstances. State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Preservation of Issue or Statement of Grounds for Review 
Issues involving plain error and exceptional circumstances 
constitute an exception to the preservation rule and thus may be 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves essentially two questions. First, was 
Mr. Angelos denied the right to counsel at sentencing? Second, 
did the district court violate the constitutional right to due 
process and breach the Plea in Abeyance Agreement by failing to 
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provide Mr. Angelos with a evidentiary hearing prior to 
sentencing? 
Initially, the State charged Mr. Angelos with four counts 
of Obtaining a Prescription Under False Pretenses, all third 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(3) (a) (ii) (Supp. 2002) . Thereafter, as part of the Davis 
County Drug Court program, Mr. Angelos appeared before the 
district court on May 9, 2000, and entered a Plea in Abeyance, 
in which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of Obtaining a 
Prescription Under False Pretenses, both of which were third 
degree felonies. In addition, the State, Mr. Angelos, and his 
legal counsel, executed a Plea in Abeyance Agreement. The 
district court accepted the plea in abeyance and ordered that 
the guilty plea of Mr. Angelos be held in abeyance for thirty-
six months. 
On May 15, 2 001, Mr. Angelos appeared without legal counsel 
before the district court for sentencing, after which the court 
summarily sentenced Mr. Angelos to the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term of zero to five years, which the court 
stayed. The district court then sentenced Mr. Angelos to one 
year in the Davis County Jail with no credit for time served. 
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The trial court signed the Sentence on May 15, 2001, which 
was entered that same day. Mr. Angelos filed Notice of Appeal 
on June 14, 2 001. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The State initially charged Mr. Angelos with four 
counts of Obtaining a Prescription Under False Pretenses, all 
third degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-3 7-
8(3)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2002) (R. 1-3). 
2. As part of the Davis County Drug Court program, Mr. 
Angelos appeared before the district court on May 9, 2 000, and 
entered a Plea in Abeyance, in which he agreed to plead guilty 
to two counts of Obtaining a Prescription Under False Pretenses, 
both of which were third degree felonies (R. 45 and R. 48). 
3. In the course of entering the plea in abeyance, the 
State, Mr. Angelos, and his legal counsel, executed both a Plea 
in Abeyance Agreement and a Davis County Drug Court Agreement 
(R. 48-52; R. 54-55). 
4. The district court accepted the plea in abeyance and 
ordered that the guilty plea of Mr. Angelos be held in abeyance 
for thirty-six months (R. 53). 
5. Mr. Angelos experienced a wide-range of success and 
failure in the course of the drug court program (See, e.g., 
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Transcript of 09/05/00 Proceedings, Tab 27, p. 1, lines 15-25 
and Transcript of 03/27/01 Proceedings, Tab 33, pp. 1-2). 
6. At one of the outermost points of the drug court 
program, Mr. Angelos had remained clean for a period of two 
hundred and thirty-six (236) days (See Transcript of 04/17/01 
Proceedings, Tab 36, p. 1, lines 18-20) . 
7. After apparently missing a urinalysis test, the 
district court ordered that Mr. Angelos be located and brought 
before the court (R. 104). 
8. On May 15, 2001, Mr. Angelos appeared before the 
district court, without legal counsel, for sentencing, after 
which the court summarily sentenced Mr. Angelos to the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term of zero to five years, 
which the court stayed (R. Ill). The district court then 
sentenced Mr. Angelos to one year in the Davis County Jail with 
no credit for time served (See Transcript of 05/15/01 
Proceedings, Tab 38, pp. 3-4; R. 110 and R. Ill). 
9. The trial court signed the Sentence on May 15, 2001, 
which was entered that same day (R. 111-12). 
10. Mr. Angelos filed Notice of Appeal on June 14, 2001 
(R. 117-20). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The district court committed plain error by failing to 
advise Mr. Angelos of the right to counsel and by failing to 
provide Mr. Angelos with legal counsel prior to sentencing. The 
obviousness of the district court's error is demonstrated by 
both case law concerning the right to counsel at all critical 
stages of the criminal proceedings and by case law expressly 
holding that it is the trial court's duty to determine if a 
defendant voluntarily and intelligently waives the right to 
counsel. 
The district court was fully aware of the constitutional 
right to counsel at sentencing due to well-established case law. 
Further, Mr. Angelos, in the course of the sentencing, requested 
at least two times that the court provide him with legal counsel 
- to no avail. 
The district court's failures adversely affected a 
substantial right of Mr. Angelos by depriving him of the 
constitutional and fundamental right to the assistance of 
counsel. Not only did the court's failures require Mr. Angelos 
to involuntarily represent himself at a critical stage of the 
criminal proceedings, those failures precluded Mr. Angelos from 
presenting, through counsel, mitigating evidence that should 
have been more fully considered prior to imposing sentence. 
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The instant case also presents exceptional circumstances. 
Although the district court knew that Mr. Angelos had previously 
been represented by counsel at other critical stages, the court 
proceeded by imposing sentence upon Mr. Angelos, who, as a pro 
se litigant, was extremely unfamiliar with, if not ignorant of, 
the constitutional and procedural requirements, not to mention 
the basic options, to which he was entitled. 
2. The district court committed plain error by violating 
both the constitutional and statutory rights of Mr. Angelos to 
due process. The district court failed to provide Mr. Angelos 
with the requisite notice and opportunity to prepare for a 
hearing during which the court sought to modify his probation 
and thereafter impose sentence. Moreover, the district court's 
failures were obvious in light of both the constitutional and 
statutory principles of due process and the case law setting 
forth and affirming the same. 
By depriving Mr. Angelos of his rights to due process, the 
district court adversely affected his substantial and 
fundamental rights to notice and opportunity to adequately meet 
the allegations concerning violations of the drug court 
agreement. The district court failed to provide Mr. Angelos 
with the statutory procedural protections set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-l(a) through (e) (Supp. 2002). 
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The case at bar also presents exceptional circumstances by 
virtue of rare procedural anomalies involving a hearing where 
the district knew that the sentencing hearing would involve an 
alleged probation violation. Although the district court knew 
that the hearing involved an alleged probation violation, it 
proceeded without providing Mr. Angelos with the notice and 
safeguards specifically set forth in the statute. The court 
proceeded with the hearing even though Mr. Angelos had not 
waived any of the procedural safeguards and even though he 
appeared as a pro se litigant with little or no knowledge of 
those safeguards. Not only did the district court deprive Mr. 
Angelos of his rights to due process, it breached the express 
terms of the Plea in Abeyance Agreement by refusing to provide 
Mr. Angelos with, among other things, an evidentiary hearing 
prior to imposing sentence. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED MR. ANGELOS7 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL BY CONDUCTING THE SENTENCING HEARING 
AND IMPOSING SENTENCE WITHOUT LEGAL COUNSEL. 
A. The Right to Counsel 
According to well-settled principles of constitutional law, 
"A defendant in a criminal proceeding has a constitutional right 
to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the 
13 
prosecution." State v. Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 506-07 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam); see U.S. Const, amend. VI;1 Utah Const, art. 
I, § 12;2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a) (1999) ;3 State v. Gray, 
601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979). Further, it is well-established that 
"[s]entencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding at 
which a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of 
counsel." State v. Caserez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) 
(citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254 (1967); Specht 
v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209 (1967); and Townsend 
v. Burke, 334 U.S. 756, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948)). The right to 
assistance of counsel "is personal in nature and may be waived 
by a competent accused [only] if the waiver is knowingly and 
intelligently' made." State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 
(Utah 1987) (citations omitted) ;4 see also Argersinger v. 
2The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence." 
2Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution provides, in 
relevant part, "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel . . . ." 
(Emphasis added). 
3Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a) (1999) provides that "[i]n 
criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: To appear in 
person and defend in person or by counsel." 
4In Frampton, the Utah Supreme Court directed trial courts 
to conduct a penetrating colloquy on the record to ensure that a 
defendant, before waiving counsel, is "'made aware of the dangers 
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Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 (1972); Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938); State 
v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874, 875-76 (Utah 1981); State v. Wilson, 563 
P.2d 792, 793-94 (Utah 1977). A knowing and intelligent waiver 
is required because * [w]hen an accused manages his own defense, 
he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the 
traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.'' 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 
(1975) . 
B. Plain Error and Exceptional Circumstances 
The issue in the instant case concerning the right to 
counsel and the district court's violation of that right is 
raised for the first time on appeal. Ordinarily, the failure to 
raise an issue before the trial court precludes consideration of 
the issue on appeal. See State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). There are, however, two limited but well-
established exceptions to this general rule. State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The 
appellate court may address an issue for the first time on 
and disadvantages of self-representation so the record will 
establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eyes open.''" State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 
1987) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 
2525, 2541 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 
317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 241 (1942)). 
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appeal if the trial court committed plain error or there are 
exceptional circumstances. Id.5 
In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court outlined the following principles involved in 
determining whether "plain error" exists: 
In general, to establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief 
from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
Id. at 1208-09; see also State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996); and State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). According to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 121-22 (Utah 1989), "in most circumstances, the term 
'manifest injustice' [found in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is 
synonymous with the 'plain error' standard expressly provided in 
Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) . . . ." 
5In State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), this 
Court'discussed three exceptions to the general rule, which, in 
addition to the plain error and exceptional circumstances 
exceptions, includes the situation where a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on appeal. 
Id. at 7 (citing State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 
1991) ) . 
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The exceptional circumstances exception serves as a "safety 
device" to ensure that "manifest injustice does not result from 
the failure to consider an issue on appeal." Archambeau, 820 
P.2d at 923. According to this Court, matters involving one's 
liberty or considerations of judicial economy may not be enough 
to justify invocation of the exceptional circumstances concept. 
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) . However, 
the exceptional circumstances concept is "properly reserved for 
truly exceptional situations, for cases --as our Supreme Court 
has recently recognized -- involving "rare procedural 
anomalies.'" Id. (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n.3.). 
C. Violation of the Right to Counsel 
The district court committed plain error by failing to 
advise Mr. Angelos of the right to counsel and by failing to 
provide Mr. Angelos with legal counsel prior to sentencing.6 
The obviousness of the district court's error is not only 
supported by case law concerning the right to counsel at all 
critical stages of the criminal proceedings but by case law 
expressly holding that "it is the trial court's duty to 
6To the extent that the sentencing concerned a modification 
of probation, see Transcript of 05/15/01 Proceedings, Tab 38, p. 
1, lines 5-6, the district court was also required by statute to 
inform Mr. Angelos "of a right to be represented by counsel at 
the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he is 
indigent." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (c) (iii) (Supp. 
2002) . 
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determine if this waiver is a voluntary one which is knowingly 
and intelligently made.7' Frampton, 837 P. 2d at 187. 
Not only should the district court have been aware of the 
constitutional right to counsel at sentencing due to well-
established case law, but Mr. Angelos, in the course of the 
sentencing, requested at least two times that the court provide 
him with legal counsel - to no avail (See Transcript of 05/15/01 
Proceedings, Tab 38, p. 4, lines 24-25; see also Transcript of 
05/15/01 Proceedings, Tab 38, p. 5, lines 13-15). 
The district court's failures concerning the right to 
counsel adversely affected a substantial right of Mr. Angelos by 
depriving him of the constitutional and fundamental right to the 
assistance of counsel. Not only did the court's failures 
require Mr. Angelos to involuntarily represent himself at a 
critical stage of the criminal proceedings, those failures 
precluded Mr. Angelos from presenting, through counsel, 
mitigating evidence that should have been more fully considered 
prior to imposing sentence. 
The instant case also presents exceptional circumstances. 
Although the district court knew that Mr. Angelos had previously 
been represented by counsel at other critical stages,7 the court 
7At the outset of the drug court program, Mr. Angelos and 
his legal counsel executed both the Davis County Drug Court 
Agreement and the Plea in Abeyance Agreement (See R. 54-55). 
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proceeded by imposing sentence upon Mr. Angelos, who, as a pro 
se litigant, was extremely unfamiliar with the constitutional 
and procedural requirements, not to mention the basic options, 
to which he was,entitled (See Transcript of 05/15/01 
Proceedings, Tab 38, p. 5, lines 13-14). 
Notwithstanding the harmfulness of the district court's 
errors, the deprivation of the constitutional right to counsel 
is deemed harmful. This is demonstrated by fact that the 
violation of the constitutional right to counsel cannot be 
considered harmless error. State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 
989 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also State v. Sampson, 808 
P.2d 1100, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 914, 112 S.Ct. 1282 (1992); 
cf. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 
950 n.8 (1984) ("Since the right of self-representation is a 
right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a 
trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not 
amenable to *harmless error" analysis. The right is either 
respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless"). 
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II. BY FAILING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO PROVIDE MR. 
ANGELOS WITH AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING PRIOR TO 
SUMMARILY IMPOSING SENTENCE, THE DISTRICT COURT 
DENIED MR. ANGELOS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS. 
A. Due Process Rights 
"The failure to give adequate notice and opportunity to 
participate can constitute a denial of due process under article 
I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution."8 Plumb v. State, 809 
P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); State v. Rawlings, 892 P.2d 1063, 
1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that no person in a criminal 
case shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . ." 
According to well-established principles of due process, 
W1Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness. "' 
Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1069 (quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 
1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted)). "X[A]11 parties 
are entitled to notice that a particular issue is being 
considered by a court and to an opportunity to present evidence 
and argument on that issue before decision.'" Id. (quoting 
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990)). 
8Article I, section 7, of the Utah State Constitution 
provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
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In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(12) (Supp. 2002), 
requires that probationers be afforded certain procedural 
protections prior to the modification of probation. See State 
v. Martin, 1999 UT App 62, fl2, 976 P.2d 1224; see also Utah 
Code Ann, § 78-18-1(12) (a) through (e) (Supp. 2002). Due 
process attaches to these statutory requirements. See Martin, 
1999 UT App 62 at Hl2 (citation omitted) . 
B. Plain Error and Exceptional Circumstances 
As with the right to counsel issue, the issue concerning 
the right to due process and the district court's violation of 
that right is raised for the first time on appeal. Based on the 
principles of plain error and exceptional circumstances set 
forth in detail above, the issue concerning the right to due 
process is reviewable for the first time on appeal. 
C. Violation of Due Process Rights 
The district court committed plain error by violating both 
the constitutional and statutory rights of Mr. Angelos to due 
process. This the district court did by failing to provide Mr. 
Angelos with the requisite notice and opportunity to prepare for 
a hearing during which the court sought to modify his probation 
and thereafter impose sentence. The district court's failures 
were obvious in light of both the constitutional and statutory 
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principles of due process and the case law setting forth and 
affirming the same. 
By depriving Mr. Angelos of his rights to due process, the 
district court adversely affected his substantial and 
fundamental rights to notice and opportunity to adequately meet 
the allegations concerning violations of the drug court 
agreement. The district court failed to provide Mr. Angelos 
with the statutory procedural protections set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-l(a) through (e) (Supp. 2002). 
The instant case also presents exceptional circumstances by 
virtue of rare procedural anomalies involving a hearing where 
the district knew that the sentencing hearing involved an 
alleged probation violation (See Transcript of 05/15/01 
Proceedings, Tab 38, p. 1, lines 5-6). Although the district 
court knew that the hearing involved an alleged probation 
violation, it proceeded without providing Mr. Angelos with the 
notice and safeguards specifically set forth in the statute.9 
The court proceeded even though Mr. Angelos had not waived any 
9Not only did the district court deprive Mr. Angelos of his 
rights to due process, it breached the express terms of the Plea 
in Abeyance Agreement by refusing to provide Mr. Angelos with, 
among other things, an evidentiary hearing prior to imposing 
sentence (See R. 51-52, Plea in Abeyance Agreement and Order, 
19). 
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of the procedural safeguards and even though he appeared as a 
pro se litigant with little or no knowledge of those safeguards 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Angelos respectfully requests 
that this Court vacate both his convictions and sentence, and 
that the Court remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with the instructions in its Opinion, and for such 
other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate under the 
circumstances of this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of September, 2002. 
^^SlLD^sWIGGINS, P.C. 
ScoETTrwig^ 
Attorneys J ^ ? ^ p p e l l a n t 
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Tab A 
Davis County Drug Court Agreement 
State of utah v. /orv^ f\^Co^ T**m^sjnm COURT 
1. I understand that I am currently charged with the following offense(s) in DaVi^^imty: 
2. I hereby agree to waive my right to trial. I understand that my plea to said charge(s) will be 
held in abeyance by the Court pending successful completion of my treatment program and other 
conditions imposed by the Drug Court. I understand that if I fail to complete the treatment program or 
other conditions imposed by the Drug Court my plea will be accepted by the Court and I will be subject 
to sentencing. I also agree to waive any statutory time periods or issues which may occur because of my 
participation in the Drug Court Program. 
3. I understand and agree that the Court has the discretion to terminate me from the Drug Court 
Program if I am convicted of a new crime or my failure to successfully complete Drug Court. 
4. I further understand that if I successfully complete the Drug Court Treatment Program as 
ordered by the Court, that the Court will dismiss the above criminal charge(s) pending against me in the 
Second District Court. 
5. I understand that upon the dismissal of the above criminal charge(s) by the Court that the 
County Attorney may not prosecute those charges in the future and that I may be in a position to file a 
motion to have the record of my initial arrest expunged by the Court. 
6. I agree to satisfactorily complete a diagnostic evaluation for my drug treatment program as 
ordered by the Court and I hereby authorize the release of all treatment information by the provider to this 
Court, the Davis County Attorney, the Davis County Public Defender, and Drug Court personnel, including 
any urinalysis test results with the understanding that such information shall not be utilized by the County 
Attorney for any prosecution of criminal charges against me. I further understand and agree, however, that 
such information may be considered by the Court in determining whether I should remain in the Drug 
Court Program or be subjected to sanctions by the Court. 
7. I agree to complete the treatment program to the satisfaction of the Court. 
8. I understand and agree that the treatment program is projected to be completed within a 12 
month period; however, I further understand and agree that the Court may extend the treatment program 
for an additional 24 months to allow me to successfully complete my requirements. 
9. I understand and agree that any failure on my part to successfully complete the treatment 
program as ordered by the Court, such as missing treatment appointments, or any failure on my part to 
abide by the terms of this agreement, requirements of Drug Court, or orders of the Court, may result in a 
hearing before the Court which can result in a modification of my treatment program or Court imposed 
sanctions, including time in jail. 
10. I agree to keep the treatment provider and the Court advised of my current address at all times 
during the treatment program and during my supervision by the Court. I also agree to report any contact 
I have with a law enforcement agency to the law enforcement officer designated by the Drug Court, within 
24 hours of such contact. 
11. I understand and agree that if I drop out of the treatment program that the fee set by the Court 
is still due and owing and funds previously paid by me are not refundable. I further understand that I will 
be required to pay for pei iodic drug tests unless such fee is waived by the court. I have been advised that 
the current fee is two dollars per test, but that may be subject to change. 
12. 1 understand that Drug Court is based on an inter-disciplinary sharing of information 
concerning my drug use. The Public Defender may be required to disclose attorney/client privileged 
communication. In order to participate in Drug Court, I waive the attorney/client privilege. I also 
understand the Public Defender has an ethical obligation to zealously advocate my interests. Drug Court 
participation may violate this duty of zealous advocacy. Therefore, I waive the requirement of zealous 
advocacy. 
13. I agree to be subject to search and seizure of my person, body fluids, living quarters and 
vehicle at the request of Drug Court personnel, without the necessity of showing any cause whatever. 
Consent for Disclosure of Treatment Information 
I hereby consent to communication between my treatment provider and the Court, the 
Davis County Attorney, the Davis County Public Defender, and Drug Court personnel. 
The purpose of and need for this disclosure is to inform the Court and other named parties 
of my eligibility and/or acceptability for substance abuse treatment services and my treatment 
attendance, prognosis, compliance, and progress in accordance with the Drug Court monitoring 
criteria* 
Disclosure of this confidential information may be made only as necessary for and pertinent 
to hearings and/or reports concerning my participation in the Drug Court. 
I understand that this consent will remain in effect and cannot be revoked by me until there 
has been a formal and effective termination of miy involvement with the Drug Court for the case 
named above, such as the discontinuation of all court supervision upon my successful completion 
of the Drug Court requirements or upon sentencing for violating the terms of my Drug Court 
involvement. 
I understand that any disclosure made is bound by Part 2 of Title 42 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, which governs, the confidentiality of substance abuse patient records, and the 
recipients of this information may redisclose it only in connection with their official duties. 
I have read the above statements of the rights that I will waive and the conditions by which I will 
abide and to which I am entitled if I am accepted into the Drug Court Program. I understand what I have 
read and do hereby knowingly give up these rights and enter in to this agreement with 
the Court in support of my petition for admission to the Davis County Drug Court Program. 
.r- 9-eo 
TabB 
William K. McGuire #2192 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-4300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE 
vs . 
TOMMY LEE 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : 
ANGELOS, : 
Defendant. 
PLEA IN ABEYANCE AGREEMENT 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 991701115 
Hon. Jon M. Memmott, Judge 
Come now above-entitled plaintiff by and through William 
K. McGuire, the defendant, Tommy Lee Angelos, and pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann., 77-2a-l et seq., enter into a Plea in Abeyance Agreement 
and request an Order of the Court as follows: 
1. Tommy Lee Angelos, the above-named defendant, is 
charged in an Information in the above-entitled matter with four 
counts of Obtaining a Prescription Under False Pretenses, each 
count a third degree felony. 
2. The defendant agrees to enter a plea of guilty to two 
counts of Obtaining a Prescription Under False Pretenses, each 
count a third degree felony to be held in abeyance according to the 
terms of this Agreement and the Order of the court hereon. 
3. The plea shall be held in abeyance for a period not 
to exceed 36 months. 
4. Counts Three and Four of the Information will be 
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dismissed as a part of this agreement. 
5. The defendant understands that ordinarily upon the 
entry of a plea of guilty or no contest, the court shall set a time 
for imposition of sentence which shall be not less than 2 nor more 
than 45 days. The defendant knowingly and intelligently waives 
such time for sentence. 
6. Upon compliance of all the conditions of this 
Agreement, the plea of guilty to the offenses of Obtaining a 
Prescription Under False Pretenses, each a third degree felony, 
will be withdrawn and the case dismissed. The conditions are as 
follows: 
(a) Tommy Lee Angelos agrees not to violate any law, 
federal, state or local,, A violation for minor traffic 
regulations shall not be a basis for termination of this 
Agreement. 
(b) Defendant agrees to complete all requirements of 
Drug Court and whatever program is determined by them to 
be appropriate for defendant's circumstances. Defendant 
further agrees to pay all fees associated with such 
program. 
7. By entering into this Agreement the defendant is 
waiving statutory and constitutional rights as follows: 
(a) The defendant acknowledges the right to the 
presumption of innocence and by entering this Agreement, 
waives that right. 
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(b) The defendant acknowledges the right against 
compulsory self incrimination and waives that right. 
(c) The defendant acknowledges the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury and waives that 
right. 
(d) The defendant acknowledges the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses and 
waives that right, 
(e) The defendant acknowledges the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses and waives that right. 
(f) The defendant acknowledges the nature and elements 
of the offense to which the plea of guilty is entered, 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and that the plea is admission of all those elements. 
The elements involved in the above-entitled matter are as 
follows: That during the month of October, 1999, 
defendant did knowingly and intentionally acquire or 
obtain possession of a controlled substance by 
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge 
or alteration of a prescription. 
(g) The defendant acknowledges an understanding of the 
minimum and maximum sentence that may be imposed, 
including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences. The possible sentence involved in 
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the above-entitled matter is incarceration at the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term of zero to five 
years and/or a fine of $5,000, plus an 85" surcharge. 
(h) This Plea in Abeyance Agreement is based upon a 
discussion and plea agreement. All the terms of the plea 
agreement are set forth herein. 
(I) The defendant acknowledges having been advised of 
the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the 
plea. In that regard, defendant acknowledges that any 
motion to withdraw the plea must be in writing and filed 
no later than 30 days from the date of this Agreement. 
Furthermore, merely because such motion is made, does not 
mean that the court will grant it. 
(j) The defendant acknowledges having been advised that 
the right of appeal is extremely limited. 
8. Defendant represents to the Court that this plea is 
voluntarily made. 
9. If, at any time during the term of the Plea in 
Abeyance Agreement, information comes to the attention of the 
prosecuting attorney or the Court that the defendant has violated 
any condition of this Agreement, the Court, at the request of the 
prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit, or 
upon its own motion, may issue an Order consistent with the 
policies of Drug Court and the Drug Court Agreement entered into by 
defendant which may include the termination of this Agreement. If, 
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following an evidentiary hearing, the Court finds that the 
defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term or 
condition of the Plea in Abeyance Agreement, it may terminate the 
Agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence 
against the defendant for the offense to which the original plea 
was entered. Upon entry of judgment of conviction and imposition 
of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in 
abeyance fee prior to termination of the Agreement shall be 
credited against any fine imposed by the Court. 
10. The defendant acknowledges that termination of a 
Plea in Abeyance Agreement and subsequent entry of judgment of 
conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any independent 
prosecution arising from any offense that constituted a violation 
of any term or condition of an Agreement whereby the original plea 
was placed in abeyance. 
11. Defendant acknowledges having read each and every 
paragraph of this Agreement and understanding of each and every 
paragraph. 
DATED this ^7 day of ft] A< 
Jilliam K. McGuire 
Deputy Davis Countv Attorney 
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Attorney /for Defendant 
ORDER 
Based upon the Agreement between the State of Utah and 
the defendant, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED that 
the plea of guilty to two counts of Obtaining a Prescription Under 
False Pretenses, each a third degree felony, be held in abeyance 
for a term of 36 months. The Court makes a finding that the 
defendant has entered the plea of guilty knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently. Upon a finding that the defendant has successfully 
completed the terms of the Agreement, the Court shall allow 
withdrawal of the defendant's plea to guilty, a felony of the 
third degree and Order dismissal of same. Upon a finding that the 
defendant has not successfully completed the terms of the 
Agreement, the plea of guilty to two counts of Obtaining a 
Prescription Under False Pretenses, each a third degree felony 
shall be entered as a conviction and all that will be left for the 
Court to do is to enter sentence thereon. 
DATED this Q ^ day of fTl<Ui , 2000. 
Tw.m. m<wflp 
JUDGE 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURfl 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UT^ 
HEip 
MAY j 5 200f 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
^J Defendant. 
n i SECOND 
SENTENCE ^IRICXCOURT 
Criminal No. °i°i 11 ft II \ °S 
Judge 
CHARGE: P a \ s ^ P r e ^ r ^ / s t O f 2 £bt)fA-< 
(Felony), (Degree 2>~ ) or (Misdemeanor), 
nk l 
(Class_ J 
JK (Prison) Sentence: Defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term of 0 - *E> years, fined $ , including surcharge, ordered to pay restitution 
of $ to , and a public defender fee of $ . 
(Jail) Sentence: Defendant is sentenced to the Davis County Jail for a term of 
(days/months), fined $ , including surcharge, ordered to pay restitution of 
$ to , and a public defender fee of $ . 
X Tl^ e following terms and conditions of probation are ordered: 
A a. The (prison/jail) term is stayed upon satisfactory completion of probation. 
3>k (years/months) to X AP&P, Court (_informal, UPS) 
^ b. Spend ISt (days/month^ in the Davis County Jail. 
Credit for time served Work Release RSAT 
_c. All of the fine is suspended upon satisfactory completion of probation but 
$ including surcharge. 
_d. Fine to be paid through AP&P/Clerk of Court at a rate of $_ 
on the of each month starting . 
e. Restitution to be paid through AP&P/Clerk of Court at a rate of $_ 
month on the of each month starting . 
jper month 
j>er 
f. Review in for 
Other: 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
)( Usual and ordinary conditions required by AP&P. 
X ALCOHOL: Do not have in your possession or under your control alcoholic beverages or frequent places 
where alcohol is the chief item of sale. 
X ALCOHOL TESTING: Submit to testing for the use of alcohol. 
ANTABUSE: Take Antabuse as directed by AP&P. 
APOLOGY LETTER: Submit a letter of apology to the victim as approved by the therapist and AP&P. 
X ASSOCIATION WITH DRUGS: Do not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells or otherwise 
distributes narcotics or drugs. 
COMMUNITY SERVICE: Complete hours of community service as directed by AP&P. 
V CONDUCT: Commit no further violations and or crimes. 
X CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE USE: Do not use, have in your possession or under your control any non-
prescribed, controlled substances. 
COMMUNITY SERVICE IN LIEU OF FINE: May satisfy $ of the fine and surcharge by 
completing hours of community service. 
X DRUG TESTING: Submit to drug testing as ordered by AP&P and/or the Court. 
EDUCATION/VOCATION: Participate in and complete any educational and/or vocational training as 
directed by AP&P. 
A EMPLOYMENT: Obtain and maintain lawful, verifiable full-time employment. 
FINES/FEES: Pay fines and fees in the amount of $ . 
\ FREQUENT DRUG PLACES: Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
GED/DIPLOMA: Obtain a GED or high school diploma. 
JAIL: Serve days in the Davis County Jail commencing . Credit for days. 
MEDICATION: Take prescribed medication as directed by a physician, the Court and/or AP&P. 
NO CONTACT: Have no contact with . 
NO CONTACT/CHILDREN: Have no verbal, written or direct contact with the victim(s) or any 
children under the age of until approved by a therapist and AP&P. When approved, all 
contact will be supervised by an adult who knows about the offense and is approved by AP&P. 
PRESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION: Notify AP&P of all prescriptions for controlled substances. 
PROGRAM/TREATMENT: Enter, participate in and complete any program, 
counseling or treatment as directed by AP&P. 
PROGRAM/TX LOCATION: Enter, participate in and complete the program at 
RECOUPMENT: Pay a recoupment fee of $_ 
^RESTITUTION: Pay restitution in the amount of $_ 
X SEARCH CONSENT: Submit to search of person, premises or vehicle and seizure of any evidence 
without search warrant at the request of police officer or probation officer, if they have reasonable 
cause. 
TESTING: Submit to any specialized testing as recommended by a therapist and AP&P. 
TRAINING: Participate in and complete any training as directed by AP&P. 
OTHER: 
DATED 5 ) ^ ^ B Y 3 L - L 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
TabD 
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH; MAY 15, 2001 
HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. ?: Ninety-four, Tommy Angelos. 
THE COURT: This is the time set for sentencing on 
the probation violation. AP&P has recommendations. Do you 
want to tell me your recommendations? 
MS. (?): Yes, Your Honor. We recommend a year in 
jail with no credit for time served, put on probation for 36 
months and as a condition of that probation that he continue 
with the out patient program upon his release from jail and any 
other treatment recommended by AP&P. (inaudible) hours of 
community service. 
THE COURT: Is there anything you'd like to say on 
your behalf with that recommendations? 
THE DEFENDANT: Was there a letter brought in today 
at all? 
THE COURT: I got a letter yesterday from you. 
THE DEFENDANT: Not from me but (inaudible)? 
THE COURT: No. I got a letter from you and then the 
AP&P recommendation. That's the only thing I've received. 
MS. (?): Your Honor, there is some (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. (?): Your Honor, we'll accept him. I spoke to 
somebody there and we'll accept him if you'll release him. 
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THE COURT: Okay. I don't think I'm going to release 
him right now. 
Anything you want to say on your behalf before I 
enter sentence? 
THE DEFENDANT: Just that I know when you came and 
talked to us at (inaudible) all the time and you said 
(inaudible) work your program well, you screw it up, which I 
did and then consequences (inaudible) are bad. I accept 
responsibility for what I did and before I screwed it up I was 
working the program. I had all the (inaudible) screening, 
counseling and did everything else and I lapsed. I don't 
believe sitting in jail helps you much more to (inaudible) 
thinking about this wishing that you wouldn't have lapsed as I 
don't think that it teaches you the lessons to learn that if 
you ever come to that conflict again on how to overcome so that 
it doesn't happen again, so it stops. That's how I feel 
(inaudible) wrong, that's just: how I feel. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me tell you how I feel in the 
circumstances. You said you relapsed but this wasn't just a 
condition of relapse. You left the situation where you were 
supposed to living. You stopped doing the things that you were 
supposed to be doing and this wasn't something that happened 
just in one day or one evening. It happened over several days 
and you had people that were there for support. You didn't 
contact them. 
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My concern is going back through your record, I mean, 
I even found things that I didn' t even know, for example that 
you had already gone through Drug Court in Salt Lake and 
graduated from Drug Court in Salt Lake. And so, it's not like 
you haven't been through a program. You've been through Drug 
Court in Salt Lake and all the programs there and rather than 
having to answer for the consequences you got here instead of 
having to answer for the consequences. You went through Drug 
Court here and you got problems. Instead of answering for the 
consequences you went into RSAT and went through a program and 
afterwards and it's my feeling that exactly what you need is 
time to sit and think and that you need to answer for 
consequences that for whatever reason, you have felt that if I 
just, that if something happens, I can get in another program 
and if I get in another program it avoids being responsible for 
your actions and I think the time has come to end that and I 
think the best thing for you is to sit for a while. 
THE DEFENDANT: Let me ask you this, release with no 
credit for no time served, I mean, I've sat in jail probably 
almost eight months. 
THE COURT: Yes, and you may not get credit for time 
served. That may be the consequence of part of your action. 
What I'm going to do is revoke the plea in abeyance. I'm going 
to enter sentence for false prescription, two counts, felonies 
of the third degree. I'm going to sentence you to the Utah 
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1 State Prison for an indeterminate term of zero to five years. 
2 I'm going to suspend the prison term. I'm going to place you 
3 on probation for 36 months with AP&P. I'm going to order you 
4 to spend one year in the Davis County Jail with no credit for 
5 time served. I'm going to place you on probation under the 
6 following consequences, that you do not use alcohol or have 
7 alcohol in your possession. You submit to testing for drug and 
8 alcohol. No association with anyone who illegally uses or 
9 sells or otherwise distributes narcotic drugs. No further 
10 violations or crimes. You do not use or have under your 
11 possession a non-prescribed controlled substances. You submit 
12 to drug testing as required by AP&P. You maintain full time 
13 employment. You submit to the search of your person, premise, 
14 or vehicle and seizure of evidence without a search warrant at 
15 the request of a probation officer or a police officer. You 
16 submit to any further counseling or treatment as ordered by 
17 AP&P. Do you have any questions about the sentence that I've 
18 entered? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Can I have a review at all? 
20 THE COURT: I'm not sure. I'll have to think about 
21 that. What the Court will do, I need to advise you if you'd 
22 like to appeal the sentence, you must make that appeal within 
23 30 days. 
24 THE DEFENDANT: I don't even have a lawyer. Can I 
25 have a lawyer appointed to me? 
MR, EDWARDS: For purposes of what? An appeal? 
THE DEFENDANT: For an appeal- Can this originally 
go back to my original Judge? My lawyer, you know about my 
lawyer I mean, can this originally go back to my original 
Judge? I don't know any of (inaudible). 
THE COURT: What, the two charges, the falsely 
dispensing prescriptions 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: - two felony charges that are before me. 
THE DEFENDANT: It was before Judge Page. 
MR. (?): You wouldn't want to take this back to 
Judge Page. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm just trying to ask. I don't know 
my options but I don't have a lawyer. My lawyer was — 
THE COURT: And you have a right to have a— 
MR. (?): This would be a really bad idea to take 
this back to Judge Page and if he's going to appeal the 
sentence that would have to from Mr. Wiggins. You understand 
you'll be out of jail before you get an decision on the appeal 
because it takes about 18 months. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't know who Mr. Wiggins is. 
MR. (?): He's a lawyer who handles the appeals under 
the public defender contract. 
THE COURT: Do you just want to talk to him, Mr. -
why don't you just talk to him. You can go back there and if 
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you want to talk to him right now for just a second and then he 
can decide what he wants to do. 
THE DEFENDANT: So do I, I mean, can I write for 
reviews or anything to that effect? 
THE COURT: There's no guarantees on anything. I've 
entered the sentence. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
